In responding to Kentor and Jang's article, the authors point to methodological problems that have led them to underestimate the level of interlocking in their reference year (1983), and thus to exaggerate the extent of the shift towards transnational interlocking. The authors also argue that Kentor and Jang fail to adequately theorize the social processes that produce corporate interlocks, and to place the practice of interlocking within its specific historical settings. It is only on the basis of sound conceptualization, valid empirical data and detailed, contextualized analysis that the contours and character of the emerging transnational business community can be ascertained.
Jeffery Kentor and Yong Suk Jang (this issue, hereafter K&J) offer an analysis of the global network of interlocking corporate directorates that purports to provide a more definite reply to the question we raised in our 2002 article, 'Is There a Transnational Business Community?'. To do this, they make use of a larger set of corporations than we did, based on different selection criteria and also different moments in time. Their use of the entire Fortune Global 500 is, in itself, a welcome advance upon the smaller and rather Eurocentric sample of 176 firms, which we employed in order to make an exact comparison back to Fennema's (1982) original study of transnational corporate interlocking.
Problems in Sampling, Measurement and Interpretation
Even so, resort to a well-known list of companies does not solve all the methodological problems in delimiting a sample for the analysis of transnational corporate interlocks. The Fortune list ranks firms by revenue, the largest component of which is sales. This criterion favours high-volume merchandizers. Hence it is no accident that Walmart now ranks first on the Fortune list. Is Walmart 'really' the world's largest corporation? This is altogether another question. Revenue is only one measure of capital size, attuned to the rate of turnover. Companies may control vast assets but not have 'sales' to show on their income statement. Sales, per se, do not exist for banks and many financial institutions, whose revenue mostly consists of interest earned, dividends from investments, fees from financial transactions, etc. Not surprisingly, the top 10 global firms on Fortune's 2002 list are all non-financials, although the assets of the world's largest financial institutions dwarf those of Walmart et al. 1 Exchange rates are also a factor when appraising the largest global corporations. The Fortune list is denominated in American dollars, which is reasonable in view of the reality of dollar hegemony in the world economy. However, that reality is changing with the rise of the euro. The relative size of companies whose financial statements are denominated in different currencies will fluctuate with exchange rates, and if the US dollar continues to lose ground against the euro we might expect to see shifts in the relative standing of 'national' corporate-capital fractions -and not necessarily because of any great microeconomic feats in capital accumulation. Most importantly, if one intends to map the network of transnational corporate interlocks it is not at all clear that a single, quantitative criterion is adequate to the task of sampling the relevant units. In both our study and K&J's, corporations sited outside the central zones of world capitalism barely figure. The massive concentration of capital within the core economies means that a straight size-based sample will poorly represent the (semi-)periphery. In K&J's 1998 sample only 26 firms are domiciled outside the core; in our samples only five are. 2 Even with the Fortune Global 500 in hand, if one wished to include in one's study an assessment of the extent of interlocking between centre and (semi-)periphery -a highly relevant issue -one would need to 'overrepresent' the latter. One of us has used this strategy in a study of the network of global corporations and elite policy groups that shows that corporations and capitalists based on the periphery and semi-periphery of the world system are 'conspicuously absent from the corporate-policy network' (Carroll and Carson, 2003: 53) . This conclusion could only be drawn because the sample was purposely designed to overrepresent (semi-)peripheral firms. The point of these remarks is that numbers such as dollar-denominated 'revenue' do not speak for themselves, and a quantitative list does not give us a transparent window on global corporations. It is misleading, and perhaps naive, for K&J to intimate that 'the goal of understanding the characteristics of the global economy in its entirety' is best served by assembling a sample purely on the basis of revenue. Sociologists need to be more reflective in making judgements as to the meaning and significance of the 'facts' that corporate-capitalist discourses, including financial accounting practices, present to us.
Let us now turn to the more substantial differences and similarities between K&J's study and ours. Unlike K&J we think the similarities just as interesting as the differences. Some crucial findings are similar across the two studies. Most of the increases in transnational interlocking have occurred within Europe, which underlines the progress in European economic integration; Japanese corporate boards remain almost entirely isolated from the transnational network; beyond Europe itself, the lion's share of transnational interlocking links North America with Europe, consistently with van der Pijl's (1984) depiction of an 'Atlantic ruling class'. However, in pointing to a 'significant increase in the number of global linkages', K&J claim that their study 'portrays very different global processes' than those suggested by our research.
K&J assume that the differences in findings are attributable to their larger, more representative sample. 3 This could be the case, but before we rush to judgement some alternative hypotheses are worth considering.
First, the differences could be partly attributable to the time difference in the observations, particularly the observation at what we might call t 1 . In our study, t 1 is 1976; in K&J's it is 1983. It is not necessarily plausible to assume, as K&J do, that the organization of the transnational and national corporate networks stood still in the interim. After all, Fennema's (1982) research established that between 1970 and 1976 -years that witnessed the end of the postwar boom and the first generalized economic recession since the 1930s -there was a proliferation of transnational interlocks, primarily spanning the North Atlantic. By the same token, the late 1970s was a period of gathering stagflation, and 1982-3 was one of deep recession, spurred in part by the concerted implementation of monetarist policy in the US and UK. It is possible that the economic dislocations and reorganizations of these years contributed to a downturn in certain corporate interlocks. That might partly account for the remarkably low level of interlocking, in Europe for instance, that K&J report for 1983, though to make such an argument one would need to show what social mechanisms lay behind the disappearance of interlocks.
More ominously, however, there is reason to doubt the validity of K&J's data. We wonder about the quality of the data for 1983. From the sources listed, they appear to have compiled their interlock data for that year from Moody's manuals, with data for firms domiciled outside the US coming from Moody's International Manual, which commenced publication in 1981. Our own experience with corporate-directorate data has been that the single most reliable source is annual reports issued by the corporations themselves, but that over time the accuracy and completeness of data in secondary sources have improved, particularly in recent years. This is in great part why we made use of Fennema's 1976 data in our research -a database constructed directly from annual reports that Fennema accessed through a large financial institution in Amsterdam. We in effect traded off the possibility of a larger sample for the very highquality data in Fennema's database. Moody is a US-based investors service, and its listings of European corporate directors can be confusing for those unacquainted with the two-board system of corporate governance that prevails on much of the continent (see Fennema, 1982; Stokman and Wasseur, 1985; Scott, 1997; Windolf, 2002) . In the two-board system, outside directors make up a supervisory board that meets less frequently and is a separate body from the board of management, which contains only inside directors. Both boards need to be included to provide a complete picture of interlocking. It is unclear that K&J's study includes them both. Also, in the early years of publication, Moody's International Manual was rather selective in coverage. We would be surprised if all 500 of the corporations in K&J's 1983 sample were listed, with full board information, although we would expect coverage of North Americanbased firms to have been good.
One can glimpse the scale of the problem by noting that for 1983 K&J find only 27 transnational interlocks among the 164 European firms in their sample. For 1976 we found nearly twice as many transnational interlocks (51) among our much smaller European sample (N = 91). It thus appears that in the seven years between 1976 and 1983 much of the transnational European network disintegrated! The first alternative interpretation we advanced above could conceivably explain part of this, although it would be difficult to reconcile such a precipitous decline in the elite integration of corporate Europe with K&J's own master narrative of an ongoing process of transnational business community development. If K&J had been more reflective in their analysis, they might have offered some substantive commentary on the apparent collapse of the transnational corporate network in Europe from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s. 4 In our view, however, there is good reason to infer from the International Sociology Vol. 19 No. 3 comparison of results that K&J's corporate-directorate data for 1983 are simply incomplete. This would also explain why, with a sample nearly three times as large as ours, they detect, in total, only 36 more transnational interlocks in 1983 than we did for 1976. We suggest that measurement problems have led them to underestimate the extent of interlocking (within Europe and probably elsewhere) in 1983, and thereby to exaggerate the shift from 1983 to 1998. Measurement error would help explain the glaring difference between K&J's basic findings and those of a host of researchers who in the past three decades have systematically analysed national corporate networks. A result that K&J trumpet in their abstract is the 'dramatic growth in domestic interlocks in certain European states'. Indeed, in their Table 3 they report findings that suggest domestic links per firm more than doubled in Germany, and increased nearly 10-fold in France, between 1983 and 1998 . Their data also indicate that in 1983 French corporations interlocked with each other at less than one-tenth the rate in the US. 5 These findings are indeed dramatic, even startling. They will be news to many corporate-network researchers, who have established that the American national network is rather diffuse and sparsely integrated compared to most continental European national networks. This wellknown difference is part of the reason why in our own analysis we adopted the distinction between the more stock-market-mediated, 'exitbased' American system of corporate governance and the more socially organized, voice-based regimes of European business. The difference between the relatively sparse networks of the US and UK and the denser, more centralized networks of the continent was well established by the 10-nations study, whose data refer to 1976 . Subsequent studies, typically using samples of the 250 largest companies in a national economy, consistently show, contrary to K&J, a weakening in interlocking -especially in the US (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Barnes and Ritter, 2001 ) but also in Canada (Carroll, 2002) and France and Germany (Windolf, 2002: 213) -just the reverse of what K&J report.
Our own work is partly located within the comparative research tradition exemplified by Windolf's study. In our 2002 article we tried to convey a sensitivity to national specificities in business systems, since it is our view that an understanding of the global must take into account such specificities or else risk being abstract and formulaic. In contrast, K&J offer nothing in the way of thinking through the comparative issues, and only a cursory nod to the American literature on interlocking directorates, which is said to have established the potential for 'collusive behaviors' among firms whose boards overlap. To make matters worse, their decision, at the outset of their analysis, to treat all interlocks as equal -whether carried by one outside director or multiple insiders -precludes any investigation of whether weak ties are coming to predominate in national and transnational interlocking, which is one of our key findings. In a sociological study that purports to be transnational in scope, the narrowness of their substantive interpretation is unfortunate, as is the lack of any real theorizing as to the meaning of interlocking directorates. The result is a study that exemplifies what C. Wright Mills (1959) called abstracted empiricism, and an unpersuasive claim that there has been a dramatic 'global shift' towards a global capitalist class operating to 'an ever greater extent, outside the control of nation-states'.
Conclusions
For the reasons outlined in the previous section, and despite the larger size of K&J's sample, we hold to our findings that there was only a modest transnationalization of the corporate network between 1976 and 1996 and that the transnational interlock network comprises a superstructure of weak ties layered upon more sturdy national networks. Although they eschew the important issue of the type of tie (e.g. strong vs weak) that connects corporate directorates, even K&J's results are for the most part consistent with this interpretation. For instance, comparing Figures 1 and 2 in their article, they report an increase of only 17 interlocks between American and European corporations from 1983 to 1998 -hardly grounds for proclaiming a dramatic 'global shift'. This is not to say that there is no trend towards globalization within capitalist classes. By the mid-19th century two prescient analysts already noted that 'the need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the entire surface of the globe' (Marx and Engels, 1974: 39) . With what Dick Bryan calls 'recent globalization', the world market has become that much more integrated, as transnational production, global financial transactions and world trade have all accelerated. 'The global integration of accumulation means that economic calculations of all kindsfrom purchases in the supermarket to the determination of the prime interest rate -are subject, quite explicitly, to international calculation' (Bryan, 1995: 13) . Global integration of this systemic kind, which we pointed to in Carroll and Fennema (2002: 396, 415) , doubtlessly enhances the structural power of capital to discipline states, communities and workers, and it also provides a basis for the kinds of transnational practices that Leslie Sklair considers integral to an emerging transnational capitalist class. Such practices include 'world best practices' that establish global norms for capitalist enterprise, a 'global corporate citizenship' that seeks to persuade state managers and general publics that TNCs can be trusted to manage themselves, and a 'global vision' that celebrates cosmopolitan consumerism as a regnant value (Sklair, 2001) . Vol. 19 No. 3 Interlocking directorships that span national borders must be situated in the context of these other elements of transnational class formation. It is equally important to place corporate interlocks within the context of other transnational networks that may be even more important to global elite integration. For the business community itself, the modest increases in transnational interlocking that we documented in our 2002 article tell only part of the story. While interlocking corporate directorates have remained for the most part nationally focused, since the early 1970s an extensive, transnational corporate-policy network has emerged. Created through the participation of leading corporate directors on the boards of such emergent global policy groups as the World Economic Forum, Trilateral Commission and World Business Council for Sustainable Development (Carroll and Carson, 2003) , such corporate-policy ties complement the predominantly weak interlocks that link corporations transnationally.
International Sociology
This additional layer of social structure, within which corporate capitalists step beyond their immediate economic interests to take up matters of global concern, pulls the directorates of the world's major corporations much closer together, and collaterally integrates the lifeworld of the global corporate elite. (Carroll and Carson, 2003: 52-3) In a similar vein, major global corporations have established advisory boards, whose interlocking directors may provide yet another layer of weak ties across firms and countries. Although Fennema (1982) included advisory boards in his study of the 1970s, in general these boards have not captured the attention of corporate-network researchers. Yet they may very well serve as crucial sites for transnational community development, at one remove from the formulation of business strategy that is the purview of corporate directorates. Future research should enquire into the shape and trajectory of the global network of corporate advisory boards as an ancillary structure to the network of interlocking corporate directorates.
What sociologists should avoid is the trap of abstract, undertheorized conceptions that dictate what transnational capitalist class formation might entail. In this regard, an interesting case with which to end this rebuttal is that of interlocks between American and Canadian corporations. K&J report, correctly, that these kinds of interlocks have diminished dramatically in recent years (a trend inconsistent with their own thesis). If interlocks were simply the means for 'collusive behaviors' one might conclude that with a lowered incidence of interlocking businesses in Canada and businesses in the US have less and less to do with each other. However, the decline of what Clement (1977) called 'continental connections' should not be mistaken for a schism between corporate capital based in Canada and the US. With the deepening economic integration kindled by NAFTA, attenuation in continental directorship ties between American parents and Canadian subsidiaries may actually reflect closer ties at an operational level, below that of corporate boards, as the Canadian subsidiary becomes simply one among various subunits within a single economic zone (Carroll, 2004) .
To appreciate national and cross-national nuances such as this one, our analyses of corporate networks need to be historically contextualized and informed by adequate theorization of the social practices that produce interlocking directorates. It is only on the basis of sound conceptualization, valid empirical data and detailed analysis that the contours and character of the emerging transnational business community can be ascertained.
Notes
1. In fact, on the 2002 Global 500 list first-ranked Walmart's assets of US$83 billion compare with 11th-ranked Citicorp's assets of US$1 trillion. Walmart, with twice the revenue of Citicorp, has less than one-tenth of the assets. 2. We include in the core firms based in Western Europe, Japan, the US, Canada and Australia/New Zealand. By (semi-)peripheral we mean the world beyond this capitalist 'core'. 3. They also argue (p. 366), erroneously, that we used a panel design, analysing the same 176 corporations in 1976 as in 1996. As we noted on p. 402 of our article, a panel design was not feasible because corporate mergers, acquisitions, bankruptcies and other forms of capital restructuring create substantial case attrition over a period of two decades. We therefore constructed the 1996 sample so that its composition matched that of 1976 with regard to two variables: domicile and economic sector (financial vs non-financial). Incidentally, in our 2002 article the European transnational Asea Brown Boveri, which K&J claim was excluded from our study, is clearly shown as one of the most central corporations in the transnational network, in both 1976 and 1996 (see Carroll and Fennema, 2002: 411, 412 ). In our Figure 3 , the Brown Boveri board is linked to major British (BP), Dutch/British (Shell), Dutch (Philips), German (BMW), Swiss (Credit Suisse) and American (IBM) boards. 4. K&J seem unaware of the implications of the discrepancy in findings regarding the integration of the European corporate network. They claim that the difference between the 27 ties they find as of 1983 and the 51 ties we find as of 1976 'is not surprising, given the over sampling construction used by Carroll and Fennema' (p. 359) . Actually, the difference is astonishing, given the far greater number of European firms in K&J's 1983 sample. 5. Similarly, K&J report in Table 3 that the number of domestic interlocks per firm among the nine Swiss firms in their 1983 sample was only 0.22; i.e. that only one pair of Swiss firms was interlocked. Given the well-known high density of interlocking among the very largest Swiss firms (Stokman and Wasseur, 1985: 31) , this finding stretches all credulity. 
